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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR ELECTION ACCESS ISSUES IN A POST-VOTING
RIGHTS ACT SECTION 5 LANDSCAPE
By
Casey Millburg*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the United States Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v.
Holder,1 states with histories of racial discrimination against voters have implemented
controversial measures pertaining to voter identification (“voter ID”), polling places,
provisional ballots, and early voting.2 Shelby County eliminated3 the preclearance
provision in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) requiring these states to receive
Department of Justice approval for proposed changes to their electoral processes, to ensure
the changes did not disproportionately impact racial minorities.4 The courts have recently
mitigated or overturned a spate of restrictive electoral measures passed since the decision.5
However, these actions often came after voters have been denied access at the polls, or not
far enough in advance of an upcoming election to implement.6
* Casey Millburg is Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2018 Juris Doctor
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.
1

Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).

2

Leah Aden, et al., Warning Signs: the Potential Impact of Shelby County v. Holder on the 2016 Election,
THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUCATION FUND (June 2016), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/2016Voting-Rights-Report-FOR-WEB.pdf.
3

Shelby County, 133 S. Ct at 2631.

4

See About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Aug. 8, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act.
5

See, e.g., N. Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016); Michigan
State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2016); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th
Cir. 2016); Brakebill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-CV-008 DLH, 2016 WL 7118548 (D.N.D. Aug. 1, 2016); Cromwell
v. Kobach, No. 15-9300-JAR-JPO, 2016 WL 4060260 (D. Kan. Jul. 29, 2016); One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. v.
Thomsen, No. 15-CV-324-JDP, 2016 WL 4059222 (W.D. Wis. Jul. 29, 2016).
6

The voter ID law at issue in NAACP v. McCrory took effect at the start of 2016, see NAACP v. McCrory,
supra note 5, at 216, but the case was filed in April and decided only after North Carolina’s presidential,
state, and Congressional primaries, see North Carolina elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/North_Carolina_elections,_2016. Additionally, the law at issue in Veasey v. Abbott
was enforced beginning mid-June 2013, see Veasey v. Abbott, supra note 5, at 227, and wasn’t overturned
until the court’s decision in 2016 after numerous elections in 2014, 2015, and 2016, see Texas elections,
2014, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Texas_elections,_2014; Texas elections, 2015, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Texas_elections,_2015;
Texas
elections,
2016,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Texas_elections,_2016. The law at issue in Brakebill v. Jaeger passed in 2015, see
Brakebill v. Jaeger, supra note 5, at *2, but the court did not issue its ruling until August 2016 after the
presidential caucus and state primary had occurred, see North Dakota elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/North_Dakota_elections,_2016. The law at issue in Cromwell took effect in January

Alternative Dispute Resolution7 (“ADR”) provisions in the Help America Vote
Act8 (“HAVA”) present one option for resolving ballot access issues in a timely manner.
HAVA, created in response to the contested 2000 presidential election, provides funding
to states to help them improve election outcomes and requires that states implement several
election programs and procedures.9 To be eligible for HAVA funding, Title IV of the Act
requires that states use ADR procedures to resolve complaints about violations of Title III
of HAVA, in the event a state does not respond to the complaint within ninety days of its
filing.10 Violations of Title III include issues pertaining to voting system standards,
provisional voting, voter information requirements, statewide voter registration databases,
and accessibility for persons with disabilities.11
Although the expeditious resolution of election access complaints is in the public’s
best interest, using ADR to resolve these claims is problematic, as it removes complaints
from the courts. Civil rights matters are traditionally decided by courts for several
important reasons. First, courts decide such matters to ensure that the issues are considered
by a jury of the litigant’s peers, each of whom has a stake in those same rights.12 Next,
courts decide such matters to ensure that the situation is subjected to meaningful scrutiny

2013, see Cromwell v. Kobach, supra, note 5 at *2, but the court did not render its verdict until late July 2016
after numerous elections in 2014, 2015, and 2016; see Kansas elections, 2013, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Kansas_elections,_2013;
Kansas
election,
2014,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Kansas_elections,_2014;
Kansas
elections,
2015,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Kansas_elections,_2015;
Kansas
elections,
2016,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Kansas_elections,_2016. Finally, the law at issue in One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. v.
Thomsen took effect in 2011, see One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, supra note 5, at *1, and was decided
at the end of July 2016 in addition to impacting a number of elections between 2011 and 2016, see Wisconsin
judicial elections, 2011, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_judicial_elections,_2011,
Wisconsin elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_elections,_2012, Wisconsin
elections, 2013, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_elections,_2013, Wisconsin elections,
2014, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_elections,_2014, Wisconsin elections, 2015,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_elections,_2015,
Wisconsin
elections,
2016,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_elections,_2016. It also had no effect on the August 2016
election which occurred shortly after the decision, see One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, supra note 5,
at *3.
7

Arbitration is a type of ADR, but for the purposes of this paper ADR refers to non-arbitration means of
dispute resolution.
8

Help America Vote Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901-21145 (2002).

9

52 U.S.C. § 20901.

10

52. U.S.C. § 21112.

11

52 U.S.C. §§ 21081-21102.

12

EEOC Notice: Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Disputes as a Condition of Employment, UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
(July 10, 1997), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html.

proportional to its import to society.13 Finally, courts decide such matters to ensure that the
decision adds to civil rights jurisprudence.14 Removing civil rights matters from the courts
poses significant problems for upholding the rights of all litigants bringing civil rights
claims. ADR takes proceedings out of the court and therefore does not utilize a jury of
peers, nor do ADR rulings contribute to American legal jurisprudence.15
Looking specifically at states which fell under the jurisdiction of VRA Section 5,
this article will first explore how these states are or are not using HAVA’s ADR provisions.
Next, it will look at litigation in these states pertaining to election access issues that has
occurred since the Shelby County decision. Finally, this article will discuss whether ADR
or the court system is the most appropriate avenue for resolving election access issues.
Ultimately, this article concludes that ADR is an inappropriate avenue for resolving
election access issues, and that these decisions are best made by the courts.
II. ADR PROVISIONS
VRA SECTION 5

IN

STATES WHICH WERE FORMERLY UNDER

THE JURISDICTION OF

A. Models of State HAVA ADR Procedures
The broad purpose of this article is to assess whether ADR is an appropriate and
effective way to resolve state-level voting rights disputes. An important element of this
assessment is looking at how states currently utilize ADR to resolve voting rights
complaints. A comparative analysis of HAVA ADR provisions in states which formerly
came under the jurisdiction of VRA Section 5 follows.
The comparative analysis is grouped in two sections. The first section looks at the
states which fell entirely under the jurisdiction of VRA Section 5, which include Alabama,
Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia.16 Second, the
analysis focuses on states in which only certain counties fell under the jurisdiction of VRA
Section 5: Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, and North Carolina.17
State administrative codes and procedures generally provide that individuals raising
HAVA complaints may submit complaints through the state Secretary of State or Board of
13

Id.

14

Id.

15

See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 964 (2000) (discussing how “ADR also results in the sacrifice
of constitutional and other public law rights through ADR processes, such as the rights to an attorney and to
due process, the appellate process’s assurance of the accurate application of public laws, and the educational
value of public decision making.”)
16

17

See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 4.

While North Carolina has a statute instructing its State Board of Elections to develop HAVA ADR
procedures, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-91, its State Board of Elections does not make the procedures publicly
available, so this paper will not include an overview of North Carolina HAVA ADR procedures.

Elections, identifying which HAVA Title III violations they believe have occurred.18
Complaints which are not resolved within ninety days from the date they are received by
the Secretary of State are resolved through ADR within sixty days.19 HAVA leaves the
choice of which ADR procedures to establish to the state.20
1. HAVA ADR Models in States Which Fell Entirely Under the
Jurisdiction of VRA Section 5
Alabama does not specify the method of ADR to be used to resolve complaints.21
Complaints that are still not resolved by ADR within 150 days from the date the original
complaint was filed with the Secretary of State are treated as resolved against the
complainant.22
In Alaska, the ADR is conducted by a hearing officer appointed by the Director of
Elections.23 The hearing officer reviews the complaint and proposes a determination for
the Director’s consideration, based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.24 The
Director makes a final determination within 150 days after the complaint was filed.25
In Georgia, the Secretary of State maintains a list of qualified mediators to conduct
the ADR, from which the Secretary of State and the complainant each select one
18

ALA. CODE § 17-2-3 (2003); ALASKA ADMIN CODE 6 AAC 25.470 (2003); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-82-.01 (2004); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 34.02.02.017; LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:567.2 (2003); N.Y. Elec. Law § 3105 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-1-22 (2003); 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 81.171 (2003); Help America
Vote Act: State of Arizona State Plan, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE 33 (May 15, 2003)
http://www.azsos.gov/hava/2003/state_plan/HAVA_Arizona_State_Plan.pdf; Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA) Complaint Form and Procedures, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE (June 16, 2013)
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/additional-elections-information/help-america-vote-act/complaintprocedure; State of Florida HAVA Plan 2006 Update, FLA. SEC’Y OF STATE, 87-88 (2006),
http://dos.myflorida.com/media/693840/hava-state-plan-2006.pdf; Complaint Process, STATE OF MICH.
BUREAU OF ELECTIONS 5, http://www.michigan.gov/documents/HAVAComplaintProc_102255_7.pdf (last
visited Oct. 29, 2016); State Plan for Compliance with HAVA, Rule 2.8: Alternative Dispute Resolution,
MISS. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ms.gov/ACCode/00000175c.pdf (last updated July 2004); Complaint
Procedures, S.C. ETHICS COMM’N, http://www.state.sc.us/scsec/t3comp_form.htm (last visited Oct. 29,
2016); Voter Complaints, VA. DEPT. OF ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.virginia.gov/votercomplaints/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
19

52 U.S.C. § 20901 (2002).

20

Id.

21

ALA. ADMIN. CODE 820-2-5-.02(3).

22

Id.

23

ALASKA ADMIN. CODE 6 AAC 25.470(a).

24

ALASKA ADMIN. CODE 6 AAC 25.470(b).

25

ALASKA ADMIN. CODE 6 AAC 25.470(c).

mediator.26 In the event that the complainant does not select a mediator, the mediator
selected by the Secretary of State will review the complaint and issue a decision. 27 If two
mediators are designated, they select a third mediator, and the three-member panel reviews
the complaint and makes a final recommendation.28 The mediator or panel must make a
final recommendation to the Secretary of State within fifty days after the final
determination of the Secretary of State is due, and the Secretary of State will issue a final
determination that is not subject to appeal.29
In Louisiana, if the State Board of Election Supervisors fails to make a final
decision within ninety days of the complaint being filed, the complaint is assigned to an
administrative law judge.30 The judge may not receive additional testimony or evidence
except in exceptional circumstances, and issues a final resolution within sixty days of the
complaint being submitted.31 The judge’s final resolution may be judicially reviewed
within thirty days of its issuance.32
In Mississippi, the Secretary of State can refer a complaint at any time for ADR, or
the right to the ADR process automatically triggers if a filed complaint has not been
addressed for ninety days.33 The Secretary of State maintains a list of approved arbitrators,
from which they and the complainant each select one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators
then select the third to complete the panel.34 Alternately, if the complainant consents in
writing, the Secretary of State may designate a single, professionally qualified individual
to serve as the arbitrator.35 The arbitrator or panel may request additional briefs or
memoranda, and determines the appropriate resolution within sixty days, which is the final
resolution and not subject to court appeal.36

26

Rule 590-8-2-.01. Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002, GA. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://rules.sos.ga.gov/GAC/590-8-2-.01 (last updated Apr. 21, 2017).
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

La. Stat. Ann. § 18:567.3(J)(1).

31

La. Stat. Ann. § 18:567.3(J)(4).

32

La. Stat. Ann. § 18:567.6.

State Plan for Compliance with HAVA, Rule 2.8: Alternative Dispute Resolution, MISS. SEC’Y OF STATE,
5, http://www.sos.ms.gov/ACCode/00000175c.pdf (last updated Jul. 2004).
33

34

Id.

35

Id..

36

Id.

In South Carolina, if the Executive Director of the State Election Commission is
unable to resolve the complaint within ninety days, it must be resolved within sixty days
by the State Election Commission.37
In Virginia, the Department of Elections selects a volunteer from a panel of state
employee volunteers to decide election related complaints.38 The volunteer recommends
an outcome within sixty days to the Election Commissioner, who can adopt or revise the
recommendation.39 The Commissioner’s final determination can be appealed to the full
State Board of Elections within fifteen days, and the State Board of Elections must decide
all appeals within forty-five days.40
2. HAVA ADR Models in States Where Only Certain Counties Came
Under the Jurisdiction of VRA Section 5
In Arizona, a complaint is initially filed with the Secretary of State, who then
determines whether to refer the complaint to the Arizona Department of Justice or the
Arizona Attorney General’s office.41
In Idaho, if a complaint is not resolved within ninety days, the complainant and
Secretary of State choose an arbitrator from a list provided by the Secretary of State by
striking names until one acceptable to both parties is chosen.42 The arbitrator then issues a
final, binding written resolution.43
Hawaii and North Carolina do not make public information regarding its ADR
provisions for HAVA voting rights complaints.44 However, a 2012 report filed by the
Hawaii Office of Elections indicates that the Office of Elections finalized contracts to

Complaint Procedures, S.C. ETHICS COMM’N, http://www.state.sc.us/scsec/t3comp_form.htm (last visited
Oct. 29, 2016).
37

Voter Complaints, VA. DEP’T OF ELECTIONS,
complaints/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
38

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 18.

42

IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 34.02.02.017.

43

Id.

44

http://www.elections.virginia.gov/voter-

The North Carolina Board of Elections, Secretary of State, and Attorney General offices do not provide
this information on their websites or in reports they have issued to the state legislature regarding voting
processes. The same is true regarding the Hawaii Office of Elections, Attorney General, and Lieutenant
Governor (who fulfills duties traditionally associated with a Secretary of State).

ensure compliance with HAVA ADR provisions, indicating that the state has some form
of ADR system in place.45
3. Trends Within Each Grouping
HAVA ADR procedures in states which formerly fell entirely under VRA Section
5’s jurisdiction are more sophisticated and detailed than those in states where only certain
counties came under VRA Section 5’s jurisdiction. They are more sophisticated in two
important ways. First, they generally provide more procedural mechanisms, meaning that
they largely provide for panel selection provisions, standards of review, and multiple layers
of review.46 In contrast, states that only have certain counties under VRA Section 5 tend to
have procedures consisting entirely of “punting” the decision to another entity.47
Second, states that previously fell entirely under VRA Section 5’s jurisdiction
largely stipulate that the person making the final determination regarding a potential
violation of voting rights must have some expertise with elections and familiarity with the
rights associated with elections.48 These models provide that final decisions are to be made
by directors of election boards or divisions, secretaries of state, state boards of elections,
administrative law judges, and arbitrators approved by secretaries of state.49 In contrast,

45

Report to the Twenty-Sixth Legislature, HAWAII OFFICE OF ELECTIONS 4 (July 25, 2012),
https://ags.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/oe_report_act_164_slh_2011_7-25-2012.pdf.
46

See, e.g., Georgia, supra note 26, and Mississippi, supra note 33, providing for panel selection provisions
which include a panel member selected by the plaintiff; Alaska, supra note 24, providing for a preponderance
of evidence standard of review of complaints; Louisiana, supra note 31, providing that no additional
testimony or evidence is usually permitted after the complaint is filed; and Virginia, supra note 38, detailing
a threefold layer of review beginning with a panel of state employee volunteers, proceeding to the Election
Commissioner, and finally to the State Board of Elections as necessary.
“Punting,” as used in this paper, means that the government entity with which the complaint is filed hands
all responsibility for resolving the complaint to another party, whether another government office, see, e.g.,
Arizona, supra note 41, or an ADR entity whose ruling is final, see, e.g., Idaho, supra note 42.
47

48

See, e.g., Alaska, supra note 25, providing that the Director of Elections makes the final decision; Georgia,
supra note 29, providing that the Secretary of State makes final decision; Louisiana, supra note 31, providing
that an administrative law judge makes the final decision; Mississippi, supra note 36, providing that a
qualified arbitrator makes the final decision; South Carolina, supra note 37, providing that the state’s Election
Commission makes the final decision; and Virginia, supra note 39, providing that the state’s Election
Commissioner makes the final decision.
49

See Alaska, supra note 25, providing that the Director of Elections makes the final decision; Georgia, supra
note 29, providing that the Secretary of State makes final decision; Louisiana, supra note 31, providing that
an administrative law judge makes the final decision; Mississippi, supra note 36, providing that a qualified
arbitrator makes the final decision; South Carolina, supra note 37, providing that the state’s Election
Commission makes the final decision; and Virginia, supra note 39, providing that the state’s Election
Commissioner makes the final decision.

states with counties which fell under VRA Section 5’s jurisdiction tend to not specify who
makes the final decision.50
Although it did not come under VRA Section 5’s jurisdiction, New York’s model
of using ADR for election disputes deserves mention, as it is appears to be the most
sophisticated model of ADR for election disputes. In New York, the complaint is referred
to one of several independent ADR agencies with which the State Board of Elections may
contract if the dispute is not resolved within ninety days of submission.51 Noteworthy in
New York’s provisions is the stipulation that ADR procedures should not be “construed to
impair or supersede the right of an aggrieved party to seek a judicial remedy including a
judicial remedy concerning any final determination made pursuant to subdivision eight of
this section.”52 The complaint arbitrator is selected from a panel of arbitrators trained on
HAVA issues and approved by the ADR agency and the State Board of Elections.53
Selection of an arbitrator occurs via a geographic selection method based on the origin of
the complaint and on a rotating basis; arbitrators may be removed from serving on a
particular case if neutrality is or may become an issue.54 The arbitrator issues the final
decision to the State Board of Elections, which then makes the final decision regarding the
complaint.55 This model is more sophisticated given the diversity of dispute resolution
entities available to complainants, as well as the explicit preservation of complainants’
rights to pursue such a civil rights matter in court. Additionally, New York’s model is also
more sophisticated as it stipulates that arbitrators must be trained on HAVA and provides
complainants with protections against potential arbitrator bias in the selection and removal
processes for arbitrators.
B. Lack of Data on State Use of HAVA ADR
In states previously covered under VRA Section 5, there exists little publiclyavailable data on whether HAVA’s ADR provisions are being used to resolve election
access disputes. The reason for the lack of data is unclear, as there also exists little data on
HAVA Title III complaints received by state secretary of state offices. Three explanations,
or some combination thereof, for this lack of information are plausible.

50

See, e.g., Arizona, supra note 41, which stipulates the entities to which a complaint may be referred, but
does not specify who makes the final decision; Hawaii and North Carolina, supra note 44, which do not detail
any HAVA ADR processes, including who makes the final decision.
51

State of New York 2015 Election Law, N.Y. STATE BD OF ELECTIONS 627 (2015),
http://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/download/law/2015NYElectionLaw.pdf.
52

Id. at 631.

53

Id. at 628.

54

Id. at 629

55

Id. at 630.

The first possibility is that states are not receiving HAVA Title III complaints.
While citizens could be unaware of the option to submit formal complaints under the
umbrella of HAVA to their state’s secretary of state office, it is doubtful that no citizen or
voting rights group in any of these states has learned of HAVA’s state administrative
complaint provisions during the past fifteen years. Further, given the volume of election
access-related legislation passed in these states since HAVA took effect,56 and the number
of elections which have taken place over the last fifteen years, it would be highly unusual
for none of these states to have received any complaints. It is also possible that a majority
of complaints are made through state-created informal complaint programs operated
independently of HAVA requirements.57
The second possibility is that states have been able to resolve HAVA Title III
complaints during the ninety day window after filing, and therefore have no need for ADR.
While plausible, if true this should not excuse states from providing data on the complaints
they resolve independent of ADR, even though HAVA does not require states to make this
data public.58 At a minimum, states should make available current information on the
nature of all complaints; the dates they were received; the dates they were resolved; and
how the complaints were resolved to ensure transparency, accountability, and public access
to this important information.
The third possibility is that complaints in these states have not been resolved within
ninety days and are referred to ADR for resolution, but states simply choose not to make
related information public. This is similarly plausible, however, it is also similarly
inexcusable. A state’s failure to timely resolve election access complaints submitted by its
residents should be public record, as should the decision to remove the resolution of that
complaint to an extrajudicial entity and that entity’s ultimate decision on the matter. A
state’s citizenry should know how a state handles important claims regarding their right to
vote within its borders. Further, both this data and data regarding claims that have been
resolved would be a useful tool for assessing whether states are neglecting to address these
important claims, and how these claims are being resolved.
III.

ELECTION ACCESS LITIGATION AFTER SHELBY COUNTY IN VRA SECTION 5 STATES

After Shelby County, changes to election facilities and procedures no longer need
to be reviewed by the U.S. Department of Justice to ensure they do not disproportionately
56

See, e.g., N. Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016); Michigan
State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2016); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th
Cir. 2016); Brakebill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-CV-008 DLH, 2016 WL 7118548 (D.N.D. Aug. 1, 2016); Cromwell
v. Kobach, No. 15-9300-JAR-JPO, 2016 WL 4060260 (D. Kan. Jul. 29, 2016); One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. v.
Thomsen, No. 15-CV-324-JDP, 2016 WL 4059222 (W.D. Wis. Jul. 29, 2016).
57

See Help America Vote Act of 2002: Virginia State Plan 2012, VA. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS 17 (Mar. 20,
2012),
https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/VA%20HAV
A%20Amended%20State%20Plan%2003-20-2012.docx (discussing the Virginia State Board of Elections’
development of informal election complaint procedures).
58

See 52. U.S.C. § 21112, which does not contain language requiring states to make this information public.

impact racial or language minorities, qualified voters who rely heavily on languages other
than English.59 States formerly under the jurisdiction of VRA Section 5 have implemented
significant changes to their voting processes, and the volume of cases indicates that these
states remain hotbeds for controversial measures which often give rise to complaints.60
Most relevant to this article are the changes these states have made to voter identification
(“voter ID”), the number of polling places, and voter registration database procedures.
Because HAVA complaints must relate to administration of Title III of HAVA,61 this
section also discusses complaints that could be brought pertinent to each area of focus.
A. Voter Identification
The Constitution does not provide individuals with an absolute right to vote, and
states may impose requirements citizens must meet in order to vote, provided there is a
compelling state interest.62 A large number of states have asserted their interest in
preventing voter fraud and increasing public confidence in elections.63
However, voter ID laws have a disproportionately negative impact on minorities’
access to the polls, specifically Black and Latino voters.64 Inadequate information about
the kind of identification required to vote means that individuals may not able to be
properly matched with their name in the ballot books, and consequently denied a ballot.
Since Shelby County, the passage of new or increasingly restrictive voter ID
legislation has been commonplace in states which formerly fell under the jurisdiction of

59

See About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 4.

60

See, e.g., N. Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016); Michigan
State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2016); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th
Cir. 2016); Brakebill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-CV-008 DLH, 2016 WL 7118548 (D.N.D. Aug. 1, 2016); Cromwell
v. Kobach, No. 15-9300-JAR-JPO, 2016 WL 4060260 (D. Kan. Jul. 29, 2016); One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. v.
Thomsen, No. 15-CV-324-JDP, 2016 WL 4059222 (W.D. Wis. Jul. 29, 2016). See also Democracy
Diminished: State and Local Threats to Voting Post-Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, NAACP (Sept. 2,
2016),
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/Democracy%20DiminishedState%20and%20Local%20Voting%20Changes%20Post-Shelby%20v.%20Holder_4.pdf (providing an
overview of election-related access litigation and regulations in states that previously fell under VRA Section
5 jurisdiction).
61

52 U.S.C. §§ 21081-21102.

62

Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2009).

63

See 146 AM. JUR. 2D TRIALS 207 (2016) (Litigation of Voter Identification Requirements Under § 2 of
Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301).
64

See Brentin Mock, More Research Shows Voter ID Laws Hurt Minorities, THE ATLANTIC/CITILAB (Feb.
5,
2016),
http://www.citylab.com/politics/2016/02/research-more-conclusive-that-voter-id-laws-hurtblacks-andlatinos/459819/; Nate Silver, Measuring the Effects of Voter Identifications Laws, N.Y. TIMES:
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VRA Section 5.65 Voter ID litigation post-Shelby County arose in numerous states
previously under the jurisdiction of VRA Section 5, directly because of the new or
increasingly restrictive voter ID laws.66 HAVA requires that states provide accurate
information to voters on voter requirements.67 Thus, a registered voter could submit a Title
III HAVA claim regarding the state or municipal election office providing inadequate or
confusing information on the types of identification required to vote.68
B. Polling Place Closures and Reductions
Polling place closures and reductions are another way that voters’ access to the
polls is often restricted.69 In reducing the number of polling places, states and
municipalities often cite budget shortfalls or an inability to comply with the Americans
with Disabilities Act.70 Closures force residents to travel longer distances to vote, which
can reduce turnout, as well as have an impact on those with disabilities.71 Further, closure
of a polling place in a minority community can result in depressed minority voter turnout.72
States formerly under VRA Section 5 jurisdiction have actively and significantly
reduced the number of available polling places. Following Shelby County, “61 percent of
Louisiana parishes [] closed a total of 101 polling places,” “34 percent of all Mississippi
counties surveyed [] closed polling places,” and in Alabama “12 counties [reduced
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locations of] 66 polling places.”73 Further, in Arizona, “almost every county reduced
[locations of] polling places,” and in Texas, “53 percent of counties . . . reduced voting
locations.”74 Litigation over closures and restrictions has occurred in several states
previously under VRA Section 5 jurisdiction.75
HAVA requires that polling places be accessible for persons with disabilities and
that the state provide adequate information to voters about voting locations and
requirements.76 Thus, a disabled voter unable to access a precinct with voting systems
equipped for individuals with disabilities due to distance, or a voter who was provided
inadequate or inaccurate information by the state about the location or operating hours of
his or her polling place, could submit a HAVA Title III claim.
C. Voter Registration Databases
Voters typically can cast a ballot only if their name appears on their election
precinct’s voter registration rolls.77 States may assert an interest in preventing election
fraud when they purge the names of voters who do not vote in a certain number of elections
from their rolls of registered voters.78 Election fraud occurs when someone submits a vote
using the identity of another person, and, in theory, more ineligible names on voter rolls
increases the risk that voter fraud could occur.79
Frequently, however, voter purges result in qualified voters being denied the right
to vote at the polls on election day, simply because they have chosen not to vote in prior
elections and their names have consequently been removed from the voter rolls.80
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Litigation regarding voter purging has arisen in at least one state formerly under the
jurisdiction of VRA Section 5.81
HAVA requires that persons who claim to be registered to vote in a jurisdiction but
are not on the voter registration list be permitted to cast a provisional ballot, which is
verified and counted after the election; individuals who are denied an opportunity to cast a
provisional ballot may bring a claim under Title III. 82 HAVA also requires that voter
registration lists be maintained “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner.”83 Thus, an
individual could bring a HAVA Title III claim if they believe discriminatory purging has
resulted in their name being improperly removed from voter rolls, or their being denied a
provisional ballot.
IV.

ADR IS NOT THE MOST APPROPRIATE AVENUE FOR RESOLVING ELECTION ACCESS
ISSUES
A. Legislation and Cases Discussing the Appropriateness of ADR for Civil Rights

Although Congress deliberately included ADR as a provision in HAVA,84 it has
Previously been stated that ADR is inappropriate in matters where “a definitive or
authoritative resolution of the matter is required for precedential value, and such
proceeding is not likely to be accepted generally as an authoritative precedent.” 85 This is
particularly true in cases regarding discrimination and civil rights, which implicate and
impact the rights of all United States citizens, and therefore should be decided in a public
forum.
A comparison between anti-trust and voting illustrates the difference between
matters which may be decided in ADR and those which are more appropriately decided by
the courts. While the Supreme Court has held that arbitration is suitable for anti-trust
disputes86 which, like voting, affect all U.S. citizens, unlike anti-trust matters voting is a
matter of intensely personal civil rights. In the American democratic system, voting
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represents a citizen’s delegation of power over their political autonomy to legislators who
will then pass the laws governing a citizen’s day-to-day life.
Congress has reaffirmed the importance of the government’s involvement in civil
rights. With respect to voting rights, Congress has clearly considered the contexts under
which enforcement of these rights should be privatized. While Congress explicitly
provided for civil enforcement and private rights of action under the National Voter
Registration Act (NVRA), in HAVA Congress required states to develop administrative
adjudication processes and included no private right of action.87 Courts have held that this
difference between the two statutes means that Congress intentionally excluded such a
private right of action in HAVA.88
Congress has asserted the importance of government involvement in other areas of
civil rights as well. The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which does not provide
for arbitration, states that part of its purpose is to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment in the
broader public interest of eliminating discriminatory practices. 89 Even with legislation
allowing for the arbitration of constitutional or statutory civil rights claims, such as the
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act (“JIAJA”),90 Congress has recognized
the importance of such decision-making remaining in the courts by stipulating that parties
must consent to such arbitration.91 Requiring consent does not necessarily mean that the
subject matter is unsuitable for arbitration or ADR, but it does reflect Congress’ judgment
that, for constitutional or civil rights matters, there should be barriers involving citizen
consent before such matters can be taken out of the courts.
The United States government’s support for keeping civil rights in the courts is
found elsewhere as well. The United States Secretary of Labor’s Task Force on Excellence
in State Government Through Labor-Management Cooperation (“the Brock Commission”)
recommended that “ADR should normally not be used in cases that represent tests of
significant legal principles.”92 Civil rights cases often do represent tests of significant legal
principles regarding the extent of individual liberties.93

87

Compare Help America Vote Act 52 U.S.C. § 21112 with National Voting Rights Act 52 U.S.C. § 20510
(1993).
88

See, e.g., Am. Civil Rights Union v. Philadelphia City Commissioners, No. CV 16-1507, 2016 WL
4721118, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2016).
89

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(3)-(4).

90

28 U.S.C. § 652(c)(2).

91

28 U.S.C. §652(b)(1).

Working Together for Public Service, U.S. SEC’Y OF LABOR’S TASK FORCE ON EXCELLENCE IN STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION 82 (May 1996),
https://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/reich/reports/worktogether/cover.htm.
92

93

See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (prohibiting racial segregation in public
schools).

Further, United States courts have previously held that civil rights are not
appropriate for resolution by ADR. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., for example, the
Supreme Court held that employees could not be precluded from pursuing discrimination
claims in a judicial forum even if they had signed an arbitration agreement.94 The Court
noted that the Title VII discrimination statute’s purpose and procedure strongly suggest
that individuals do not forfeit private causes of action if they first pursue their grievances
to final arbitration.95 The Court held that civil rights are too critical to confine to only one
possibility for remedy, and that such “statutory rights are independent of the arbitration
process.”96
Similarly, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., while the Court precluded
an employee from further pursuing his claims in a judicial forum after final arbitration, the
Court reasoned that, unlike in Gardner, it did “not perceive any inherent inconsistency
between these policies . . . and enforcing [arbitration] agreements.”97 The Gilmer court
found that legal remedies and institutional practice as to the selection of the arbitrator
adequately protected the rights of the employee.98
The Supreme Court has held that statutes governing discrimination claims must
preserve a complainant’s right to pursue the claim in court.99 Further, the Court has
cautioned, “[C]ourts should ever be mindful that Congress . . . thought it necessary to
provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims.
It is the duty of courts to assure the full availability of this forum.”100 Between Congress’
clear mandate and the repeated judicial emphasis on the need to adjudicate civil rights in a
judicial forum, there is little legislative or legal support for using ADR to decide civil rights
claims without parties’ express agreement to resolve such disputes in arbitration.
B. Other Ways ADR is Used to Resolve Rights Issues
There are other statutes which utilize ADR provisions to resolve rights issues. The
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act101 provides for the use of ADR by federal
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administrative agencies where the parties agree.102 Congress has also stated, in the Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act (“JIAJA”), that ADR is appropriate where “the
case involves complex or novel legal issues.”103
Further, the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) uses an ADR program to
expedite resolution of campaign law violations by candidates, campaign workers, or
political action committees.104 The program contains several noteworthy characteristics.
Both the FEC and the respondent work towards a mutually agreeable resolution that
emphasizes compliance with the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), and if that is
unattainable the case may be referred to mediation.105 The respondent selects a neutral,
experienced professional mediator from a list provided by the FEC’s ADR office; all
individuals on the list come from the private sector and have no ties to the FEC.106
Should a settlement be reached, it is a matter of public record, but it cannot serve
as precedent for other cases that come before the FEC as, under the program, settlement is
not an admission of liability.107 Additionally, documents used in negotiations with the ADR
office are unavailable to the FEC’s Office of General Counsel in the event that the parties
do not reach a settlement in negotiations with the ADR Office.108
C. Drawbacks to Using ADR to Resolve Rights Issues
There are many drawbacks to using ADR to resolve rights issues, particularly ballot
access issues. Both courts and ADR tribunals resolve disputes, but whereas ADR’s focus
is on resolving a dispute, courts also consider the public values shaping rights laws by
looking to Congressional intent to inform their opinions.109 Procedurally, this results in
different approaches to matters brought to their attention.
Certain remedies are available under civil rights laws that may not be available
through ADR due to the private, extrajudicial nature of dispute resolution, such as
injunctions ordering states or municipalities to act in a certain manner.110 Individuals may
102
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be discouraged from bringing their claims to the government if they know they are unable
to litigate them in court and pursue these remedies. As Congress and the Supreme Court
have stated, an individual should be able to decide whether to forego the courts and resolve
a complaint through ADR.111
Further, mandatory ADR not only undermines an individual claimant’s interest but
also the public’s interest in maintaining fair elections. Those who would deprive others of
ballot access should be prosecuted under the public’s civil rights laws in the public forum
of the courts.
Though state election commissions or Secretary of State offices may be the entities
responsible for enforcing voter discrimination laws, courts serve as the final guard for the
enforcement of statutes, examination of claims, and providing of relief. Unlike ADR
officials, courts have coercive authority to ensure compliance with their orders. Further,
while society upholds certain standards for judges,112 there are no requirements in HAVA
about qualifications and characteristics of ADR officials, and state criteria vary for
individuals who may serve in that role.113
Courts also establish precedent, which provides guidance that may help prevent or
deter violations of the law. ADR is extrajudicial and does not require that decisions be
written or reasoned, and therefore does not develop the law.114 ADR is not suited towards
developing guidance regarding rights and responsibilities or enhancing compliance with
the laws. Further, unlike ADR, the public nature of court proceedings means they are in a
position to provide notice to the community of the “costs of discrimination,” and of the
“identity of violators of the law and their conduct.”115
Finally, the private nature of ADR presents further challenges in civil rights cases,
particularly with HAVA Title III complaints. A number of important requirements are
absent from HAVA and left to states to determine: whether ADR decisions should be made
public without the consent of the parties; whether and how to publicize such decisions; and
how the ADR officer is selected.116 The private nature of ADR leaves little room for the
public to assess the adequacy of the procedures and standards selected by the state,
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particularly when, as with HAVA complaints, there exists little to no data on whether and
how ADR provisions are used.
D. How ADR Could Most Effectively Be Applied to Resolve Election Access Issues
Even the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has gone “on record in
strong support of voluntary ADR programs that resolve [] discrimination disputes in a fair
and credible manner.”117 The EEOC notes that the complainant must freely make a decision
to enter ADR, however.118 An effective election access ADR program would need to
incorporate several additional provisions.
Such a system should first and foremost have some sort of federal judicial presence,
given the highly sensitive and important nature of the right to vote. Ideally, a federal judge
should supervise the ADR proceeding. Unlike in arbitration, nothing is bartered in a civil
rights ADR claim. Civil rights are legal rights which must be protected. Final oversight, at
least, should be rest in the courts.
Next, who serves as the ADR officer is a critical matter, in terms of ensuring the
outcome is accepted as legitimate. An ombudsman model is one promising option. Georgia
currently utilizes an ombudsman program to address concerns of abused and neglected
children by providing independent oversight of those providing services to victims of child
abuse and neglect. In an election context, states could similarly place former judges,
attorney generals, or individuals with significant experience in civil rights matters in
charge of HAVA complaint dispute resolution, to ensure there is independent oversight of
government agencies providing election access to citizens.119
Neutrality of the ADR officer is also of critical importance. Several state HAVA
ADR models, such as those for Alaska, Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia, provide that
the final determination of a complaint rests with a political figure or entity, such as the
Secretary of State or the state Board of Elections.120 A decision related to voting rights
should not be made by an individual who is beholden to interests other than the successful
resolution of the matter at hand, such as a political party.
Further, a variety of remedies should be available to complainants. Financial
settlements and injunctions should all be valid options. While arbitrators are able to order
such a private injunction, in arbitration both parties opt into the proceedings, while only
the civil rights complainant opts into HAVA’s ADR, making the system more adversarial.
Finally, current data on the types of complaints submitted and how they are
resolved should be made publicly available on a regular basis in an easy-to-access format.
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Public accountability of the privatization of civil rights adjudication is critical, and this data
allows the public to assess how the ADR program is functioning.
V.

CONCLUSION

Congress’ attempt to prevent a repeat of the problematic 2000 presidential election
and strengthen the United States’ electoral systems is to be applauded. However, the right
to vote is a fundamental part of the American democratic system. A system that resolves
citizens’ election access claims in an extrajudicial setting should be subjected to stringent,
uniform standards to ensure complaints are given proper redress, if not abolished entirely
and left to the courts.
Congress should, as a condition of continued HAVA appropriations to states,
require them to submit data on the usage and outcomes of their ADR systems. If the
evidence shows minimal use and effective resolution within state departments, Congress
should consider eliminating the ADR requirement in HAVA entirely. If the evidence shows
the ADR provision is being frequently used in states, Congress should require that states’
ADR procedures meet strong, uniform standards that facilitate thorough and independent
assessment of complaints and afford parties an opportunity for judicial appeal.

